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Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.-The
Moral Force of His Language
Bennett L. Gershmant
The enduring strength of Justice William J. Brennan Jr.'s
constitutional vision is a tribute to his extraordinary scholarship
and powerful logic. His opinions will be studied, cited, and
honored for generations for their immense contribution to the
constitutional protection of individual rights. But there is a fur-
ther dimension to his jurisprudence that has always struck
me - the moral force of his language. Justice Brennan's elo-
quent, passionate, and compassionate prose constantly exhorts
us to a higher moral plane. To the disadvantaged, the accused,
the dissident, and the condemned, Justice Brennan's words are a
timeless anthem of sustenance and hope.
Reverberating throughout his literature are themes of
human dignity, autonomy, equality, and freedom. "Respect for
the individual . . . is the lifeblood of the law,"' he wrote. His
dissent in Jones v. Barnes' is insightful. The Court held that an
indigent defendant has no constitutional right under the sixth
amendment to require court-appointed counsel to raise viable is-
sues on appeal if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,
feels otherwise.3 Justice Brennan disagreed. According to the
sixth amendment, he wrote, "counsel must function as an advo-
cate for the defendant, as opposed to a friend of the court."4
Counsel is obligated to respect his client's choices "unless they
would require lawyers to violate their consciences, the law, or
their duties to the court."'5 The Court's decision "risk[s] deepen-
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. A.B. 1963, Princeton University;
L.L.B. 1966, New York University.
1. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970).
2. 463 U.S. 745, 755 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3. Jones, 463 U.S. at 750-54.
4. Id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 764.
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ing the mistrust between clients and lawyers .... ", "[H]aving a
lawyer becomes one of the many indignities visited upon some-
one who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice
system."'7 He went on:
Finally, today's ruling denigrates the values of individual au-
tonomy and dignity central to many constitutional rights, espe-
cially those Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that come into
play in the criminal process. Certainly a person's life changes
when he is charged with a crime and brought to trial. He must, if
he harbors any hope of success, defend himself on terms - often
technical and hard to understand - that are the State's, not his
own. As a practical matter, the assistance of counsel is necessary
to that defense. Yet, until his conviction becomes final and he has
had an opportunity to appeal, any restrictions on individual au-
tonomy and dignity should be limited to the minimum necessary
to vindicate the State's interest in a speedy, effective prosecution.
The role of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as
the instrument and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity
in all phases of the criminal process.8
An overarching theme of Justice Brennan's vision of indi-
vidual rights is his view that state criminal justice processes
should embrace, through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, all of the fundamental values and standards
contained in the federal Bill of Rights. Justice Brennan wrote in
Malloy v. Hogan9 that adopting such standards "reflects recog-
nition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accu-
satorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is its essential mainstay."'10 He applied this reasoning in
Malloy, holding that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination should protect citizens in state courts to the same
extent that it protects citizens in federal courts.1'
The Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the States only a "watered-down, subjec-
tive version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights"....
6. Id. at 762-63.
7. Id. at 764.
8. Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
9. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 8.
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It would be incongruous to have different standards determine
the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared pros-
ecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state
or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceed-
ing is justified."
In the landmark case of In re Winship," Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, similarly espoused that in all criminal
prosecutions the due process clause requires a standard of proof
of "beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 14 He further described the val-
ues underlying the concepts of accusation and guilt:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this
vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The ac-
cused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of im-
mense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that
he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual
should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there
is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispen-
sable to command the respect and confidence of the community
in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being con-
demned. It is also important in our free society that every indi-
vidual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense with-
out convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty.
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature
of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 5
12. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
13. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
14. Id. at 361.
15. Id. at 363-64.
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Justice Brennan's commitment to human dignity and au-
tonomy inspired a broad defense of the right of privacy in a va-
riety of contexts. In Eisenstadt v. Baird," for example, in strik-
ing down a statute that prohibited unmarried couples from
having access to contraceptive devices, he wrote:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa-
tion of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.17
Justice Brennan anticipated the Court's "gradual but deter-
mined strangulation" of the exclusionary rule. 18 In United
States v. Calandra,"9 which foreshadowed this piecemeal erosion
by holding that the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment
did not apply to grand jury proceedings,20 Justice Brennan
wrote: "The judges who developed the exclusionary rule were
well aware that it embodied a judgment that it is better for some
guilty persons to go free than for the police to behave in a for-
bidden fashion.' In United States v. Leon,22 the controversial
decision that modified the exclusionary rule to allow into evi-
dence illegally seized items obtained by police in good faith reli-
ance upon a search warrant, Justice Brennan's powerful dissent
reminds us that we pay a price for living in a free society.
If nothing else, the Amendment plainly operates to disable the
government from gathering information and securing evidence in
certain ways. In practical terms, of course, this restriction of offi-
cial power means that some incriminating evidence inevitably will
go undetected if the government obeys these constitutional re-
16. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
17. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
18. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-29 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(fourth amendment exclusionary rule should bar evidence obtained by officers acting in
reasonable reliance upon a warrant that ultimately proves invalid).
19. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
20. Id. at 351-52.
21. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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straints. It is the loss of that evidence that is the "price" our soci-
ety pays for enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, some criminals will go free not, in Jus-
tice (then Judge) Cardozo's misleading epigram, "because the
constable has blundered," but rather because official compliance
with Fourth Amendment requirements makes it more difficult to
catch criminals. Understood in this way, the Amendment directly
contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will
be lost to the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary
rule, but the Amendment itself that has imposed this cost."
We also pay a price, Justice Brennan reminds us, for having
the freedom to speak, to publish, and to think. In New York
Times v. Sullivan,24 one of his greatest first amendment achieve-
ments, he eloquently defended a newspaper's right to print false
criticism about public officials. Holding that the first amend-
ment protects such defamatory falsehoods unless there is proof
of "actual malice," Justice Brennan wrote:
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."5
Twenty-five years after Sullivan, an increasingly isolated
voice on an increasingly conservative Court, Justice Brennan
persuaded a majority of the Court, in Texas v. Johnson,'6 to
strike down as violative of the first amendment a statute
criminalizing the desecration of the American flag. He wrote:
The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish
those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade
them that they are wrong.... And, precisely because it is our flag
that is involved, one's response to the flag burner may exploit the
uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no
more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's
own, no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by
saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dig-
23. Id. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 270.
26. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
1991]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
nity even of the flag that burned than by - as one witness here
did - according its remains a respectful burial. We do not con-
secrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we
dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents."
Justice Brennan's majestic language illuminates constitu-
tional discourse and becomes a lyric to the highest aspirations of
humanity. He was the champion of the dissident and the dispos-
sessed. In Trop v. Dulles,28 he defended the social outcast, argu-
ing that Congress has no power to impose the punishment of
expatriation upon an American citizen for desertion.2 9 In Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents,30 he championed academic freedom,
ruling that loyalty oaths are anathema to constitutional liberty."1
In Goldberg v. Kelly,32 he championed the underclass, ruling
that welfare benefits are not a mere privilege bestowed by an
indulgent society upon poor people, but are an entitlement that
may not be taken away absent the safeguards of due process.3 3
Reverberating through his opinion are the themes of human dig-
nity and autonomy:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.
We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of
the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the
background of our traditions, has significantly influenced the de-
velopment of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare,
by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal
malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified
frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere
charity, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The
same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare,
counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to re-
27. Id. at 419-20.
28. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
29. Id. at 109-11 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
31. Id. at 603-04.
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. Id. at 262-65.
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ceive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to
that end.34
Justice Brennan's commitment to the principles of human
equality contended against the harsh realities of gender and ra-
cial discrimination in American life. This commitment inspired
his memorable opinions in Frontiero v. Richardson,5 and Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke."' In Frontiero,
Justice Brennan addressed the virulent prejudice against
women:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such dis-
crimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic pater-
nalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage. Indeed, this paternalistic attitude became so firmly
rooted in our national consciousness that, 100 years ago, a distin-
guished Member of this Court was able to proclaim:]
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity,
of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the fam-
ily institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator.
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradu-
ally became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between
the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the
position of women in our society was, in many respects, compara-
ble to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit
34. Id. at 264-65 (footnote omitted).
35. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statutes recognizing female, but not male, spouses of mili-
tary personnel as dependents violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment).
36. 438 US. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the goal of achieving a di-
verse student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in admis-
sions decisions).
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in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied
the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal
guardians of their own children. And although blacks were guar-
anteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that
right - which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and po-
litical rights" - until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment
half a century later.
8 7
His concurring opinion in Bakke is a harbinger of the monu-
mental debate over affirmative action:
Our Nation was founded on the principle that "all Men are
created equal." Yet candor requires acknowledgment that the
Framers of our Constitution, to forge the 13 Colonies into one
Nation, openly compromised this principle of equality with its an-
tithesis: slavery. The consequences of this compromise are well
known and have aptly been called our "American Dilemma."
Still, it is well to recount how recent the time has been, if it has
yet come, when the promise of our principles has flowered into
the actuality of equal opportunity for all regardless of race or
color.
The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in the Consti-
tution of our abiding belief in human equality, has been the law
of our land for only slightly more than half its 200 years. And for
half of that half, the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment
was largely moribund so that, as late as 1927, Mr. Justice Holmes
could sum up the importance of that Clause by remarking that it
was the "last resort of constitutional arguments." Worse than
desuetude, the Clause was early turned against those whom it was
intended to set free, condemning them to a "separate but equal"
status before the law, a status always separate but seldom equal.
Not until 1954 - only 24 years ago - was this odious doctrine
interred by our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and its
progeny, which proclaimed that separate schools and public facili-
ties of all sorts were inherently unequal and forbidden under our
Constitution. Even then inequality was not eliminated with "all
deliberate speed." In 1968 and again in 1971, for example, we
were forced to remind school boards of their obligation to elimi-
nate racial discrimination root and branch. And a glance at our
docket and at dockets of lower courts will show that even today
officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing of the past.
Against this background, claims that law must be "color-
37. 411 U.S. at 684-85 (citations and footnote omitted).
[Vol. 11:509
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blind" or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public
policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of
reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us
that race has too often been used by those who would stigmatize
and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot - and, as we shall
demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which
merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to
private parties who receive federal funds - let color blindness
become myopia which masks the reality that many "created
equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by
the law and by their fellow citizens.s8
No constitutional protection elicited Justice Brennan's in-
volvement more passionately than his belief that the eighth
amendment prohibits capital punishment. His relentless com-
mitment to this position produced a massive body of literature
against the death penalty. He dissented from every denial of cer-
tiorari by the Court in a capital case. 9 Thus, Justice Brennan,
together with Justice Marshall, wrote: "Adhering to our views
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, Gregg v. Georgia, we would grant certiorari and vacate
the death sentence in this case.' 40 His majestic concurring opin-
ion in Furman v. Georgia,"' embodied the emerging themes that
reverberate in hundreds of his decisions. In Furman he wrote:
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated kill-
ing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a
denial of the executed person's humanity. The contrast with the
38. 438 U.S. at 326-28 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations and footnote omitted).
39. A Westlaw search produced 1379 Brennan dissents from denials of certiorari in
capital cases. See, e.g., Boggs v. Muncy, 111 S. Ct. 2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Albanese v. Illinois, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Illinois,
488 U.S. 900 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ghent v. California, 485 U.S. 929 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Mapes v. Ohio, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Waldrop v. Alabama, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Zant, 459
U.S. 1092 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Georgia, 454 U.S. 882 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Steelman v. Arizona, 449 U.S. 913 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Jacobs v. Alabama, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Woodkins v. Texas,
431 U.S. 960 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Aword v. Florida, 428 U.S. 923 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Paradis v. Idaho, 468 U.S. 1220, 1220 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
41. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident. An indi-
vidual in prison does not lose "the right to have rights." A pris-
oner retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free ex-
ercise of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments,
and to treatment as a "person" for purposes of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws. A prisoner remains a member of
the human family. Moreover, he retains the right of access to the
courts. His punishment is not irrevocable. Apart from the com-
mon charge, grounded upon the recognition of human fallibility,
that the punishment of death must inevitably be inflicted upon
innocent men, we know that death has been the lot of men whose
convictions were unconstitutionally secured in view of later, retro-
actively applied, holdings of this Court. The punishment itself
may have been unconstitutionally inflicted, yet the finality of
death precludes relief. An executed person has indeed "lost the
right to have rights." As one 19th century proponent of punishing
criminals by death declared, "When a man is hung, there is an
end of our relations with him. His execution is a way of saying,
'You are not fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere.' "42
One death penalty case stands out from the rest. In Mc-
Clesky v. Kemp,4 capital punishment and racial discrimination
are dramatically fused. Notwithstanding a concededly valid sta-
tistical study showing that black defendants who killed white
victims were much more likely to receive the death penalty than
any other capital defendant, the Court declined to find this
practice unconstitutionally discriminatory." Against this judg-
ment, Justice Brennan wrote:
At the time our Constitution was framed 200 years ago this
year, blacks "had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect. Only 130 years ago, this Court relied on these observa-
tions to deny American citizenship to blacks. A mere three gener-
ations ago, this Court sanctioned racial segregation, stating that
"[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of
the United States cannot put them upon the same plan."
42. Id. at 290 (citation omitted).
43. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
44. Id. at 319.
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In more recent times, we have sought to free ourselves from
the burden of this history. Yet it has been scarcely a generation
since this Court's first decision striking down racial segregation,
and barely two decades since the legislative prohibition of racial
discrimination in major domains of national life. These have been
honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that in three decades we
have completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning
centuries. Warren McCleskey's evidence confronts us with the
subtle and persistent influence of the past. His message is a dis-
turbing one to a society that has formally repudiated racism, and
a frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to regarding its destiny
as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at our
peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its
influence in the present.
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share
a fate in no way connected to our own, that our treatment of
them sounds no echoes beyond the chambers in which they die.
Such an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of
injustice are not so. easily confined. "The destinies of the two
races in this country are indissolubly linked together," and the
way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of
moral commitment among the living.
The Court's decision today will not change what attorneys in
Georgia tell other Warren McCleskeys about their chances of exe-
cution. Nothing will soften the harsh message they must convey,
nor alter the prospect that race undoubtedly will continue to be a
topic of discussion. McCleskey's evidence will not have obtained
judicial acceptance, but that will not affect what is said on death
row. However many criticisms of today's decision may be ren-
dered, these painful conversations will serve as the most eloquent
dissents of all.'
Justice Brennan's attack on the cold, mechanical manner in
which capital sentencing decisions frequently are reviewed pro-
duced a wrenching dissent from the Court's refusal to stay an
execution. In Lowenfield v. Butler,"' the petitioner sought a stay
on the ground that he lacked the mental capacity to be exe-
cuted."' Supporting his application, Lowenfield presented to the
Louisiana trial court, and then to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
45. Id. at 343-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
46. 485 U.S. 995 (1988).
47. Id. at 995 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1991)
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an affidavit from Dr. Marc Zimmerman, a licensed clinical psy-
chologist, who after interviewing and testing Lowenfield con-
cluded that "'it is highly probable that Mr. Lowenfield is suffer-
ing from paranoid schizophrenia.' ",48 Dr. Zimmerman testified
that "'[a]s a paranoid schizophrenic, Mr. Lowenfield's capacity
to understand the death penalty would be impaired. Indeed, my
clinical interview with Mr. Lowenfield indicated that he is cur-
rently unable to understand the death penalty.' "9 The prose-
cutor presented no evidence to refute this conclusion which, if
accepted, would have constituted a more than sufficient showing
to stay the execution.5 0 Nevertheless, the state courts denied the
motion without any findings or explanation." Lowenfield then
filed an application for habeas relief with the federal district
court.5 2 The district court denied the application on the basis of
an "extended" ex parte conversation with Dr. Zimmerman. " A
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed in an opinion that reached the Supreme Court's cham-
bers fifteen minutes before the scheduled execution." The entire
review process took less than thirty-six hours.5 Justice Brennan
wrote:
48. Id. (quoting affidavit A-792, Lowenfield, 485 U.S. 995 (No. 87-6780)).
49. Id. at 995-96 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 996.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Justice Brennan described the proceedings:
1) Onthe afternoon of April 11, petitioner filed in Louisiana state court a petition
for postconviction relief raising the claims that are now before us.
2) Laterthat afternoon the state trial court denied relief.
3) At 6 p.m. (Eastern Daylight Time) the next day, April 12, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court denied relief and petitioner applied to the District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus.
4) At 8:30 p.m. the District Court denied petitioner's application.
5) At 12:10 a.m. that same night the Court of Appeals affirmed.
6) At 12:45 am. (15 minutes before the scheduled execution) the Court of Ap-
peals' opinions were circulated to this Court.
7) At 1:05 a.m., with petitioner already strapped in the electric chair, this Court
denied his application for a stay of execution.
8) At 1:25 a.m. petitioner was pronounced dead. Time ran out before we voted on
the certiorari petition that accompanied petitioner's stay application.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/4
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The haste that attended disposition of this case is reprehen-
sible. It is hardly surprising that a case scudding through the
state courts in 24 hours should yield orders devoid of law or
logic - the ones in this case simply read, "DENIED" - for
which the description "terse" would be charitable. If the federal
courts are intent on accelerating the pace at any cost, as they
were in this case, their only choice is to take procedural shortcuts
and give short shrift to substance. And simple arithmetic suggests
grave injustice when the Court of last resort takes 15 minutes to
read and analyze 17 pages of opinions from the court below and
cast a vote on life or death.
Due process means little if it requires the courts to provide
an "opportunity to be heard," without imposing on them a con-
comitant duty to listen - and, at least when a life is at stake, to
listen very carefully. Presumably, it was in recognition of the in-
justice that four of us (one less than the requisite five) voted to
stay petitioner's execution, so as to consider his insanity claim in
an atmosphere that was not itself lunatic.
Regrettably, this case is not atypical. It is the natural prod-
uct of a penal system conducive to inaccurate factfinding and
shoddy analysis. And I doubt that any system could be devised to
cure the evil, so long as States continue to impose punishments so
severe as to be irrevocable. Even were I not convinced that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, I would have no part
of a penal system that permits a State's interest in meting out
death on schedule to convert our constitutional duty to dispense
justice into a license to dispense with it.
I dissent."
Justice Brennan's concluding words in his 1986 Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard Law School provide a fitting
coda to this great Justice's career on the Court:
I am convinced that law can be a vital engine not merely of
change but of other civilizing change. That is because law, when it
merits the synonym justice, is based on reason and insight. Deci-
sional law evolves as litigants and judges develop a better under-
standing of the world in which we live. Sometimes, these insights
appear pedestrian, such as when we recognize, for example, that a
suitcase is more like a home than it is like a car. On occasion,
these insights are momentous, such as when we finally under-
56. Id. at 999-1000 (citations omitted).
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stand that separate can never be equal. I believe that these steps,
which are the building blocks of progress, are fashioned from a
great deal more than the changing views of judges over time. I
believe that problems are susceptible to rational solution if we
work hard at making and understanding arguments that are
based on reason and experience. With respect to the death pen-
alty, I believe that a majority of the Supreme Court will one day
accept that when the state punishes with death, it denies the hu-
manity and dignity of the victim and transgresses the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, That day will be a great
day for our country, for it will be a great day for our
Constitution.57
57. Brennan, The 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture: Constitutional Adjudi-
cation and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 313, 331
(1986).
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